INDIVIDUALS, CULTURE AND THE DESIGN OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS

To choose Social Citizenship as a title for a conference seems to mark the uncertainties about the relative stress that should be placed upon the social and on the individual in the design of our future in such spheres as education, industry and the environment. The currency of self-contradictory slogans such as "Social Citizenship" signals a society on the move from one world view to the next; and there are problems because we are crossing the boundary between one stable form of existence and another. The slogan signals the new emphasis on the social whilst acknowledging the hitherto prevailing individualism implicit in the notion of citizen. The distinction between the social and the individual is mirrored by the dilemma between how far the future is to be planned and how far it simply emerges from the activities and intentions of individuals and groups. The remarks in this piece attempt neither completeness nor a linear argument, but are an exploration of the notion that tension between polar opposites lies at the heart of dynamically stable social systems.

If we are to rely on the activity of planning, i.e. designing the future, how do we ensure the relevance of our plans to the life and work of the people who will be affected by the outcome of the planning? Is it enough to rely on the expertise of existing planners, or do we have work in a new way in each project? There are established skills and experience based upon professional practice that designers may draw upon to make their work efficient; but is the outcome necessarily of relevance to those who use the designed artifacts or live in the designed environment? If not we may have to consider participatory planning.

The conflict between efficiency and relevance, or effectiveness of decision-making procedures, is one that is echoed elsewhere. For example, in the design of assessment procedures, between the requirements of validity or relevance on the one hand, and reliability, on the other. (Assessment is about decision making. Indeed, assessment is but a ritual when it is not designed to answer a question.) The most relevant form of assessment of competence of an activity is one which is based upon performance of the activity itself. This view is used to argue for assessing student performance by profiles and by continuous assessment rather than subjecting them to special assessment tasks. The counter argument is that a formal procedure, based upon the same assessment tasks faced by all students is less dependent on local circumstances of the test situation.

People are differently inclined about whether they stress validity or stress reliability. The two requirements are in conflict, reflecting the opposing characteristics of fitting to the individual circumstances and standardisation. Such conflicts between requirements were in evidence in the manufacture of rifles, an early example of industrial automation in the USA. Crafted construction, i.e. individual fitting, leads to better guns but to non-interchangeability of parts, as well as less efficient production.

Decisions are often thought of as being about dear situations where they may be taken automatically by procedure, for example stock re-ordering when quantities fall below given levels, or about fuzzy situations when human judgment is essential. Computerised decision making may replace human judgment in routine applications but not where information is incomplete or evaluation of possible outcomes uncertain, because the decisions depend upon idiosyncratic preference or alternative interests which would be served by a different range of outcomes. The centrality of diverse perspectives and interests is what makes decision-making essentially problematic.

Arguments for participation in the development of the future or in the design of artifacts are about relevance of the products of design. In this respect I see arguments for participation couched in terms of democratic ideals as being about relevance. Counter-arguments concern the need for efficiency in the planning process and the impossibility of obtaining adequate participation. We may hear the question, "How can we expect participants to have the range of analytical and communication skills necessary to participate?'

I believe there are deep issues to be faced about the ability to participate. Arguments about ability are sometimes referred to in terms of literacy problems. At the time of writing, the British Government is making a play for the need for "basic skills" as a citizen's right. We also hear about the need for "computer literacy". It seems easier to talk about needs if we can refer to them as procedures which can be taught - or at least that can be assessed. We may say that understanding is a goal, but we can only test behaviour. I believe that we need to consider literacy - or literacies - as more than merely simply performance skills. We need to see literacies as being about social practice, as Tacchi puts it, that is as means by which we encounter and place ourselves in the world. We do so in more-or-less common and in more-or­less idiosyncratic ways. If literacy is too tightly defined then we are all made dyslexic in one way or another by our incapacity to cope fully with all the formal media in prescribed ways. If on the other hand we are able to negotiate the media, the discourse, we employ, then participation by the many becomes more possible.

sumber : Diktat Kuliah Komputer dan Masyarakat